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NOTES AND COMMENTS
U.S. Adoption of the International
Standard of Patent Priority: Harmony or
Schizophrenia?
I. INTRODUCTION
When two or more inventors file patent claims for the same
invention and both meet the patent requirements, the granting
agency must decide who will be granted the patent. In most
nations, the issuing agency grants the patent to the first inventor
to file the patent application.1 The United States is unique among
Western nations in that it grants priority to the first to invent
rather than the first to file.2 If the United States were to adopt a
first-to-file system, the first inventor to file a patent application in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") or a
foreign patent office with reciprocal priority provisions would be
entitled to the patent, even if someone else conceived or made the
invention first.3
Efforts to harmonize U.S. patent laws with those of other
nations are underway.4 These changes are motivated by the fear
that, without harmonized intellectual property laws, the United
States will continue to lack effective remedies for piracy of
intellectual property otherwise protected by U.S. law.5 Harmoni-
zation advocates suggest that the United States should modify its
patent laws as a quid pro quo for stronger intellectual property
protection abroad.6 International harmonization will also enable
U.S. applicants to obtain foreign patent protection more quickly
and less expensively than is currently possible.7
1. Bernarr R. Pravel, Why the United States Should Adopt the First-to-File System for
Patents, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 797, 797 (1991). The Philippines is the only other country that
awards priority on the first-to-invent basis. Id.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 797-98.
4. David Goldman et al., Patent Harmonization Bills Introduced, 4 J. PROPRIETARY
RTS. 33 (1992).
5. Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward
New Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273, 274-78 (1991).
6. David Goldman & Aim6e H. Weiss, U.S. To Consider Patent Grant Policy Change,
4 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 30 (1992).
7. One proposed change is to extend the term of the patent from 17 to 20 years.
Goldman, supra note 4, at 33. Another proposed change is to allow applicants to file in
any language. Goldman & Weiss, supra note 6, at 30.
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Adoption of a first-to-file priority system is probably the most
controversial proposed change to U.S. patent law.' Many scholars
have explored the proposed adoption of the first-to-file rule by the
United States, focusing on the practical and/or political implica-
tions of the proposed change.9 In this analytical framework,
whether the United States should adopt the first-to-file system will
depend on whether the practical effect of the change is advanta-
geous to U.S. parties with vested interests."0 This method is not
without its perils, for any change in substantive or procedural law
can result in changes that are either detrimental or advantageous
to parties with longstanding interests.
In addition to practical and political implications, a first-to-file
system may conflict with the underlying policies and theoretical
justifications for intellectual property protection. This Comment
explores these conflicts. Both theoretical and practical consider-
ations have had a significant impact on the evolution of intellectual
property law in the United States. If the United States can adopt
a first-to-file system without remodeling settled legal doctrines of
patent law, harmonization may be worth the price. If the result is
to tear the very fabric of U.S. patent law and cast adrift almost
two hundred years of settled doctrine and policy, perhaps the price
is too high.
This Comment will address the issues surrounding adoption of
the first-to-file system in light of the underlying policies and
theoretical justifications for intellectual property protection. First,
this Comment will present the four primary policies justifying
intellectual property. Next, this Comment will explore and
compare the development and status of patent law in the United
States and the United Kingdom ("U.K."), emphasizing their
underlying policies. Comparison with U.K. patent law is especially
insightful for several reasons. First, U.K. intellectual property law
has influenced the development of intellectual property law
8. Jochen Pagenberg, The WIPO Patent Harmonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 2
(1991).
9. Pravel, supra note 1, at 797. See also Ned L. Conley, First-To-Invent: A Superior
System for the United States, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 779 (1991).
10. For an excellent summary of the practical arguments for and against adoption of
a first-to-file patent system by the United States, see Charles R.B. Macedo, First-To-File:
Is American Adoption of the International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 18
AIPLA Q.J. 193 (1990). Parties with vested interests include patent attorneys, small and
large corporations, individual inventors, and those who would benefit from adoption of the
first-to-file system as a quid pro quo for concessions from other nations. Id. at 222-27.
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worldwide. Even U.S. patent law derives many of its principles
from U.K. patent law. Second, current U.K. patent law has been
substantially harmonized with the patent law of the European
Community."1 This Comment will then explore the theoretical
bases for the first-to-file and first-to-invent systems. Finally, this
Comment will conclude that the first-to-file system is fundamental-
ly inconsistent with the underlying policies and theoretical
justifications of U.S. patent law.
II. THEORETICAL BASES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
There are four basic theories that justify protecting intellectual
property. They are: (1) the natural rights theory; (2) the reward
for labor theory; (3) the contract theory; and (4) the monopoly-
profit-incentive theory.
A. Natural Rights Theory
The natural rights theory of intellectual property is based on
the notion that people have inherent property rights in their ideas
and that unauthorized use of those ideas is equivalent to steal-
ing. 2 Under this view, society is morally obligated to protect the
person's property right.'3 As with other property rights, the right
11. Bradford C. Auerbach, Biotechnology Patent Law Developments in Great Britain
and the United States: Analysis of a Hypothetical Patent Claim for a Synthesized Virus, 6
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 563, 570 (1983).
12. See A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First
Century, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 1097, 1109-10 (1989). Intellectual property protection is also
adopted as a quid pro quo for trade concessions from other nations. Because theoretical
justifications for intellectual property protection become immaterial under these
circumstances, this Comment does not address this issue. It should be noted, however,
that this practice is particularly prevalent in developing nations, which do not view
protection of intellectual property as a major domestic issue in its own right. For these
nations, intellectual property rights have almost no moral dimension, and are not justified
in terms of rewarding the inventor or stimulating invention. Instead, intellectual property
rights are viewed on an equal footing with piracy in a subjective effort to weigh the
relative economic benefits. Thus, intellectual property protection is negotiable. These
nations have adopted intellectual property protection for several reasons, including: (1)
pressure exerted by foreign governments in the form of trade sanctions; (2) "importance
of trade and investment relations with ... developed nations"; (3) "importance of the
nation's overall relationship with ... developed nations"; (4) prospects for future
innovative activity taking place in the nation's economy; and (5) "the nation's economic
development strategy." See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS,
GLOBAL CONFLICT? 17-18 (R. Micheal Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988).
13. Fritz Machlup, Patents, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 465 (David A. Sills ed., 1968).
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to exclude is inherent in intellectual property. 4 To a limited
extent, the natural law theory of intellectual property protection
is based on concepts of individual and personal sovereignty and
the concept that some sovereignty over personal possessions is
essential to personal dignity. 5 As described over a century ago:
The constitution does not attempt to give an inventor a right to
his invention or to an author a right to his literary productions.
No such thing. But the constitution recognizes an original,
pre-existing, inherent right of property in the invention, and
authorizes congress to secure to inventors the enjoyment of that
right. But the right existed before the constitution and above
the constitution, and is, as a natural right, more clear than that
which a man can assert in almost any other kind of property.
What a man earns by thought, study, and care, is as much his
own as what he obtains by his own hands. It is said that, by the
natural law, the son has no right to inherit the estate of his
father-or to take it by devise. But the natural law gives man
a right to his own acquisitions, as in the case of securing a
quadruped, a bird, or a fish by his skill, industry, or persever-
ance. Invention, as a right of property, stands higher than
inheritance or devise, because it is personal earning. It is more
like acquisitions by the original right of nature.
16
Under the natural rights theory, a person has a property right
in her own ideas even in the absence of positive law.'7 That right
matures when the idea is acquired, and, therefore, the right to
exclude others from using the idea vests upon conception.
One can use natural rights principles to argue against patent
monopolies as well. Because the right granted is the right to
exclude, resolution of a priority quandary also requires an inquiry
into the competing rights of other potential inventors. While the
right to an invention may vest at the time of its conception, it is
unclear when the right to exclude vests, allowing the inventor to
exclude others who have independently developed the same
idea." It is well established in common law that property
14. Id.
15. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 45
(1989).
16. Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201,202 n.1 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514) (quoting
Mr. Webster).
17. Machlup, supra note 13, at 465.
18. This is important because the monopolistic character of patent laws may preclude
an inventor from using her own independently-derived invention.
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owners' rights and privileges are not unlimited.'9 Therefore,
intellectual property rights could be described as a positive law
exception to their subjects' natural right to imitate an inventor's
idea.2
B. Reward Theory
Intellectual property protection has also been justified as a
just reward for the inventor's efforts to develop the invention.2'
Although this reward can take many forms, intellectual property
laws generally reward the inventor with some form of limited
monopoly. Under this theory of intellectual property, the reward
offered to the inventor is proportional to the invention's usefulness
to society.22
C. Contract Theory
Under the contract theory, the purpose of intellectual property
protection is to coax secrets from those who would otherwise not
reveal them.' This theory presumes a bargain between the
inventor and the public, with the inventor surrendering the
possession of valuable secret knowledge in exchange for a
monopoly on the right to make, use, or sell embodiments of the
idea.24 The contract theory also presumes that industrial progress
is desirable and that keeping inventions secret hinders such
progress. If inventors were not coaxed into divulging their secrets,
the benefit to society would be delayed, or perhaps even lost
forever upon the death of the inventor.
D. Monopoly-Profit-Incentive Theory
The monopoly-profit-incentive theory is based on the premise
that industrial progress is desirable and that it is best fostered by
encouraging invention.' This theory views invention as an
19. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1361-62 (1989)
(citing the rule against perpetuities, the doctrine of adverse possession, and eminent
domain as examples of common law restrictions on property rights and privileges).
20. Such was the Austrian rationale for the granting of intellectual property rights.
See Machlup, supra note 13, at 465.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 465-66.
23. Id. at 466.
24. Id.
25. Machlup, supra note 13, at 466.
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inherently risky endeavor that often requires substantial invest-
ment capital in research and development.26 Without patent
protection, return on such investment is limited to the temporary
competitive advantage obtained in the interval between the
introduction of the improved product to the marketplace and the
imitation and production of the same item by competitors.27 In
order to make it worthwhile for investors to risk money on
inventive activity, society must intervene and increase the expected
value of investors' profits. Under this theory, this incentive is
granted by a temporary monopoly in the form of exclusive patent
rights in the invention.'
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. AND U.K. PATENT
LAWS
This section will compare the influence of intellectual property
theories on the development and current provisions of U.S. and
U.K. patent laws. First, this section will contrast the development
of patent law in the United States with that of the United
Kingdom, noting the influence that the theoretical justifications of
intellectual property have had on each system. Next, this section
will present a comparative analysis of the major principles of
current U.S. and U.K. patent laws, noting the degree to which
these principles concur with the theories of intellectual property.
A. Development of Intellectual Property Law
1. Origins of Intellectual Property Law
The concept of intellectual property has been recognized since
the fourth century B.C.29 The debate over the merits of intellec-
tual property began when Hippodamus of Miletos called for a
system of awards for those who discover useful things for the
state."0 Early discussions considered the scope of protection that
should be offered by intellectual property laws. Aristotle argued
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (1992).
30. Id. at 1-2.
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that the "things" protected should not include law, as law should
not change too quickly or it will lose its force to compel obedi-
ence.
31
In the fifteenth century, the Republic of Venice granted
inventors the right to exclude others from making a particular
invention.32 The Venetian patent statutes are an early example
of the contract and reward theories of intellectual property.
3
The Venetian statutes are also examples of monopoly rights that
were awarded to entice foreign and local skilled craftsmen into
creativity and to reward their efforts. Therefore, modern intellec-
tual property protection ultimately traces its genesis to notions of
mutually beneficial arrangements between the government and the
inventor: a monopoly in exchange for secrets or a reward for labor.
2. Development of Intellectual Property Law in the United
States
The ratification of the U.S. Constitution yields little insight
into the fundamental rationale for establishing the nation's
intellectual property law. The natural rights theory of intellectual
property protection is evidenced by the statutes adopted by some
of the American colonies before the adoption of the Constitution.
These statutes recognized the inventor's right to a patent. 4 Con-
versely, the natural rights theory was also used to support the
claim that intellectual property rights are not based on an
individual's right to her own ideas, but rather as a positive law
exception to the general rule that the government would not grant
private monopolies.35
The text of the Patents and Copyrights Clause36 supports the
monopoly-profit-incentive, contract, and reward theories, as
indicated by its avowed purpose: "[t]o promote the Progress of
31. Id.
32. Oddi, supra note 12, at 1102-03.
33. "The preamble [to the patent statute] makes it clear that the Venetian
Government deemed it in the pubic interest to provide an inducement not only to local
inventors, but also to foreign creators who made inventions that would benefit the
community." Id.
34. Machlup, supra note 13, at 463. In 1791, one year after the first patent laws were
enacted in the United States, the French Constitutional Assembly also adopted patent laws
declaring that the inventor's natural property right was based on the "rights of man." Id.
35. Macedo, supra note 10, at 210-15.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Science and useful Arts."37  On the other hand, it has been
argued that the grant of power to Congress under the Patents and
Copyrights Clause is both a grant of power and a limitation of
power.38 Consequently, only the monopoly-profit-incentive and
bargain theories of intellectual property apply.3 9
The U.S. Constitution and the circumstances surrounding its
adoption shed little light on the fundamental rationale behind the
adoption of intellectual property rights in the United States.
Delegates passed the Patents and Copyrights Clause with little
debate, suggesting to some that "[tihe delegates clearly believed
firmly that it was in the public interest to establish a patent and
copyright system."'  Yet, the lack of debate does not necessarily
point to a unified position on the justification of intellectual
property concepts. The quick ratification of the Patents and
Copyrights Clause may conceivably be explained as an agreement
on the principle of intellectual property protection, not its
theoretical justification. In fact, the foregoing evidence suggests
that, during the constitutional era, all of the theories of intellectual
property protection were advanced in support of the Patents and
Copyrights Clause.
3. Development of Intellectual Property Law in the
United Kingdom
In the United Kindom, royal patent privileges were not
conferred to grant exclusive rights, but to allow the grantee to do
what was prohibited under existing rules, to reward favorites of the
court or supporters of the royal coffers, or to provide anti-compet-
itive protection for craftsmen's guilds.4 Thus, U.K. intellectual
property laws began from an entirely different premise than U.S.
laws. While its origins are obscure, the principle of giving priority
to the first person to request a patent was established in this era
before the adoption of the Statute of Monopolies. 2 Because the
37. Id.
38. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159-64 (1989).
39. See Macedo, supra note 10, at 210-15.
40. Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System-The Past Is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'Y 437, 439 (1980) (stating that "[tihe colonists in New England naturally were familiar
with the system in effect in the mother country").
41. See Machlup, supra note 13, at 463.
42. Edward Armitage, Two Hundred Years of English Patent Law, in Two HUNDRED
YEARS OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 12-13
[Vol. 16:697
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Crown granted monopolies as a royal prerogative for favors to the
Crown, the identity of the first person to conceive of the invention
was irrelevant.
In response to these abuses, the English Parliament enacted
the Statute of Monopolies, which forbade granting monopolies,
except for patents to the "first true inventor" of a new manufac-
ture.4' Following the adoption of the Statute of Monopolies,
however, the grant of a patent was still a royal prerogative, as the
sovereign was not compelled to grant a patent, regardless of the
merit of the claim." Therefore, the source of the right to a
patent monopoly was not the "natural right" of the inventor, but
rather an exercise of sovereign powers for the benefit of the
public.
The Statute of Monopolies later became the basis for many
current patent laws, including those of the United States.
45
Inspired notions of natural rights to intellectual property later
found expression in the United States and France, but not in
England.' Modem U.K. patent legislation dates from the
establishment of the Patent Office in 1853 and the enactment of
the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act of 1883. 47 In 1907, the
Patents and Designs Act mandated an official search through prior
specifications to determine novelty.' U.K. patent law underwent
considerable change with the passage of the Patents Act of 1949.
The current law governing patents is the Patents Act of 1977. The
Patents Act of 1977 was enacted to harmonize the patent law of
the United Kingdom with the European Patent Convention 49 and
the Community Patent Convention,5" and to modernize U.K.
patent law.51
(1977).
43. Macedo, supra note 10, at 211-12.
44. Armitage, supra note 42, at 4-5.
45. Macedo, supra note 10, at 211.
46. Id.
47. The Designs and Trade Marks Act of 1883 has since been repealed. 35
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 131 (4th ed. 1981).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 137.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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B. Theoretical Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Patent Laws
1. General Patent Law Requirements
The grant of a U.S. patent requires that the invention be
useful,52 novel,53 and non-obvious in light of relevant prior
art.54 Furthermore, the patent application must be filed within
one year of public disclosure or offer for sale.5 A patent may be
denied if (1) the inventor has abandoned their right to a patent;
5 6
or (2) a foreign patent has issued to the same inventor for the
same claim(s) less than a year after it was filed in that country;
57
or (3) the inventor is not the first and true inventor; 8 or (4) the
invention was disclosed but not claimed in a previously filed
patent.5 9 A U.S. patent gives the holder the exclusive right to
make, use, or sell the invention for seventeen years.'
The grant of a patent in the United Kingdom requires that the
invention be new,61 involve an inventive step,62 and be capable
of industrial application.63 A patentee may be denied a patent if
she is not the true inventor.6  In return for disclosure of her
invention, the inventor is given a monopoly in the use of the
invention for a period of twenty years, after which it becomes a
part of the public domain.65
52. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
53. Id. § 102(a).
54. Id. § 103.
55. Id. § 102(b).
56. Id. § 102(c).
57. Id. § 102(d).
58. Id. § 102(f).
59. Id. § 102(e).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
61. Patents Act, 1977 § 1(1)(a) (Eng.).
62. Id. § 1(1)(b).
63. Id. § 1(1)(c).
64. Id. § 7(2)-(4). See also HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 47, at 321
(stating that the function of this provision is to enable cases of misappropriation of
inventions or parts of inventions to be resolved and that this provision is not appropriate
for disputes over ownership); Armitage, supra note 42, at 13 (stating that the first true
inventor is the first to file).
65. Patents Act, 1977 § 25(1) (Eng.).
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2. Novelty
a. Novelty Under US. Patent Law
In the United States, an invention must be novel to be
patented. Novelty requires that, on the date the inventor con-
ceives of the invention, the invention is not known or used by
others in this country nor patented or described in a printed
publication anywhere.'- This requirement is based on the
principle that the inventor must conceive something new to
deserve a patent.67
This basic novelty requirement is consonant with all of the
four theories justifying intellectual property protection. Under the
natural rights theory, a person may have the natural right to those
inventions that they discover, but this right may be superseded by
the right of another who has already discovered the invention.
This is inherent in the natural law notion that a person's right to
her intellectual property vests at the conception of the idea.
The novelty requirement is also consistent with the reward
theory of intellectual property. Under the reward theory, the
inventor's reward should be proportional to the societal value of
the invention. An inventor who produces a non-novel invention
is entitled to no reward, as a redundant disclosure of the invention
is not useful to society. Only the first disclosure is worthy of
reward.
Under the contract theory, no consideration exists, because
the inventor who divulges something that is already known brings
nothing to the bargaining table. The novelty requirement is also
consonant with the profit incentive theory because allowing
persons to monopolize that which is already in the public domain
would discourage invention.
The novelty requirement has been the subject of considerable
judicial interpretation, especially with regard to the scope of
knowledge or use that constitutes an anticipation,' and what
66. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). "Known or used by others in this country" means publicly
known. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. General Instrument Corp., 275 F. Supp. 961, 972 (D.R.I.
1967), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 399 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1968).
67. MERGES, supra note 29, at 163.
68. An invention is anticipated by prior art when the invention is not new or lacks
novelty over that art. See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156 (1892).
1994] 707
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constitutes a printed publication. In the United States, the
invention is compared to prior art on the date of conception, not
on the filing date.69 The basic novelty requirement is common to
patent laws worldwide and can reasonably be traced to any of the
intellectual property justifications. Yet, the judicial refinement and
interpretation of these rules are a clear indicator of the underlying
policy preferences and theoretical justifications for intellectual
property protection.
The first important aspect of novelty is the scope of what is
"known or used." The phrase "known or used" has been
interpreted to include only that which is publicly known or
otherwise reasonably available to the public.7' This interpretation
leads to anomalous situations where a product can be conceived,
reduced to practice, and in limited public use, yet still not bar, for
want of novelty, another inventor from claiming exactly the same
invention.7' This may occur in a situation where the extent of
public use or knowledge is so limited that it precludes any serious
possibility that the invention will become generally known to those
who may use the information to further technical progress.72
Initially, the notion that prior art must be publicly known to bar
a patent appears to be inconsistent with the natural rights theory
of intellectual property. If a person has a natural right to her own
ideas, and that right matures upon conception of the idea, even
obscure prior art should be considered for novelty purposes. If
obscure prior art were not considered, the first person to conceive
of the invention may later be precluded from making, using, or
selling it by a monopoly right granted to another person.
U.S. judicial interpretation of "known or used" is consistent
with the contract and reward theories of intellectual property.
Because the inventor comes to the bargaining table with informa-
tion that was previously unknown to the public and likely to
remain so, the public receives valuable consideration in exchange
for the grant of a monopoly. The fact that the inventor was not
69. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). See also Bates v. Coe, 98 U.S. 31, 34 (1878).
70. Hughes Aircraft Co., 275 F. Supp. at 972.
71. See National Tractor Pullers Ass'n, Inc., v. Watkins, 205 U.S.P.Q. 892 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (limited public knowledge of invention does not invoke statutory bar). But see
Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333 (1881) (where a woman's private use of a corset spring
was deemed adequate public use for a § 102(b) bar).
72. See National Tractor Pullers Ass'n, 205 U.S.P.Q. at 892.
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the first to make the invention is irrelevant, so long as she is the
first to come to the bargaining table.
The requirement that the information be reasonably available
to the public is also consistent with the profit incentive theory of
intellectual property because the investor would otherwise be
subject to unacceptably high risk levels under a literal interpreta-
tion. For example, suppose an inventor conceives of a unique
paper clip design. She obtains financing from a venture capitalist
to develop the invention to make it more economically producible.
If "known or used" were judicially interpreted to include even
obscure publicly known information, the inventor and her investor
would be unable to confidently pursue the invention confidently
without a substantial risk of losing the patent due to lack of
novelty. Under the current U.S. interpretation of "known or
used," the investor is still subject to a considerable amount of
risk,73 but the risk is proportionally lower because obscure
knowledge is removed from consideration, leaving only knowledge
reasonably available to the public. In addition, even if the
inventor were granted a patent for the invention, the patent could
be freely infringed so long as the challenger could find anyone in
the United States who had conceived of the invention on an earlier
date.7" The possibility that a challenger could find an earlier
inventor is reduced by judicially limiting the scope of relevant
prior art to that which is reasonably available to the public.
Judicial interpretation of novelty under U.S. law as "publically
known," therefore, reveals a policy that, upon first inspection,
appears to be contrary to natural law principles of intellectual
property and more consonant with the reward, contract, and profit
incentive theories. Yet, a closer inspection reveals that the
"publicly known" novelty requirement is consistent with natural
law concepts when viewed in light of other elements of U.S. patent
73. Because complete novelty searches are usually far more expensive to complete
than the patent is to obtain, most patents are pursued after a limited novelty search that
includes only issued U.S. patents. Because an infringer need only find limited public
access to the invention anywhere in the United States, the inventor is exposed to risks that
are not only impossible to avoid completely, but economically unwise to eradicate.
74. In such a case, the infringer would have a tactical advantage over the patent
holder. When looking for prior art, the inventor must exercise some discretion, or she may
prematurely divulge her invention to the public. The infringer need not exercise such
discretion, and could openly search out those who may have preconceived the invention.
By interpreting "known or used" as reasonably available, the patentee can be less
concerned with obscure prior art.
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law. Although a person who was the first to conceive of an
invention cannot defeat another's patent application for lack of
novelty, under U.S. law, she can claim the invention for herself.
71
U.S. law merely prevents her from using lack of novelty to prevent
another from obtaining a patent that she is apparently unwilling to
pursue. An inventor who fails to apply for a patent or is not
diligent in pursuing the invention is simply not on equal terms with
another inventor who has independently derived the same
invention and is interested in disclosing it to the public. Thus, the
first inventor's natural right to the monopoly is protected, so long
as that right is actively pursued and not effectively abandoned.
The second important aspect of novelty is the critical date.76
In the United States, novelty is measured on the date of concep-
tion. Therefore, to obtain a patent, the invention must have been
novel on the date the inventor conceived the invention. 7 In
addition, U.S. law allows an inventor to antedate a prior art
reference by filing a Rule 131 affidavit containing specific facts that
indicate that she conceived the invention before the date of the
prior art reference.78  The inventor need not provide corrobo-
rating evidence of the conception.79
Establishing the date of conception as the critical date is
consistent with the natural rights and profit incentive theories of
intellectual property. Under the natural right theory, the inven-
tor's right to the invention vests when she conceives the invention.
Eliminating other public disclosures or knowledge after this date
is consistent with this theory because the inventor has already
"claimed" the invention for herself Thus, Rule 131 is an addition-
al indication of the strong preference U.S. law gives to the first
person to conceive the invention.
Under the profit incentive theory, the intellectual property
rights are granted to increase the expected value of return for
investments in inventive activity. Under the U.S. system, an
75. If she claims the invention, the patent examiner will declare an interference
proceeding, and she will be entitled to prove that she was the first to conceive the
invention and that she diligently reduced it to practice. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g), 135 (1988).
76. The "critical date" for Section 102(a) purposes is the date at which the novelty of
the invention is appraised. For example, if the critical date for novelty purposes is July
21, 1990, any publicly known prior art after that date will not be considered in resolving
the novelty of the invention.
77. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
78. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1992).
79. Id. § 1.131(b).
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inventor who conceives an invention can pursue the invention
confident in the knowledge that a subsequent public disclosure by
another will not nullify her potential gain.'
Measuring novelty at the time of invention is inconsistent with
the contract and reward theories of intellectual property. Under
the contract theory, an inventor is not entitled to a monopoly
unless she offers consideration for the grant of the patent. If the
inventor were to conceive an invention and that invention is
publicly disclosed in a prior art reference before she is able to file
for the patent, she has nothing to bring to the bargaining table.
Similarly, under the reward theory, the inventor should be not be
entitled to a reward, as her contribution to society was preempted
by the prior disclosure.
In light of these considerations, the critical date under U.S.
law is most consonant with the natural rights and profit incentive
theories of intellectual property. U.S. law fundamentally inconsis-
tent with the contract and reward theories, however, in that the
critical date for novelty purposes is the conception date rather than
the filing date.
b. Novelty Under UK. Patent Law
In the United Kingdom, a patent for an invention may be
granted only if the invention is new81 An invention is deemed
new if it does not form a part of the state of the art.' In the
case of an invention, the state of the art comprises all matter that,
at any time before the priority date of that invention, has been
made available to the public by written or oral description, use, or
in any other way.' As in the United States, the novelty require-
ment in the United Kingdom has been the subject of considerable
judicial interpretation.
The scope of prior art is the first crucial novelty parameter to
consider. The scope of prior art that will defeat a patent for want
of novelty in the United Kingdom is similar to that in the United
80. Section 102(b) will bar the inventor from the patent if the disclosure by another
occurs more than twelve months before the application is filed. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
Because the disclosure must be "public" and there is a one year grace period, however,
the inventor need only diligently monitor any potential public disclosures and file within
one year of the public disclosure.
81. Patents Act, 1977 § 1(1)(a) (Eng.).
82. Id. § 2(1).
83. Id. § 2(2).
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States. Under the Patents Act of 1949, an invention was "made
available to the public" in the statutory sense if it had been made
known to at least one person other than its proprietor who was
free in law and equity to deal with it as he pleased.8s It is
unclear, however, whether these words will be accorded the same
meaning in the Patents Act of 1977.
The second critical novelty parameter to consider is the date
at which the novelty of the invention is determined. In the United
Kingdom, the critical date is the date on which the patent
application is filed.s5 The inventor cannot antedate a prior art
reference.' This sharply contrasts with the critical date in the
United States, which is fixed at the date of conception by the
inventor.'
Under the natural rights theory of intellectual property, the
inventor's rights vest upon conception. Under this theory, an
inventor who is the first to conceive an invention should not be
barred from obtaining a patent merely because another person
later discloses the invention.' By fixing the critical date as the
date of filing, the novelty provisions of U.K. patent law are funda-
mentally inconsistent with natural rights principles of intellectual
property.
Under the profit incentive theory, the grant of a patent
encourages invention by increasing the expected value of return on
investments in inventive activity. Allowing a junior inventor's
disclosure of the invention to bar the senior inventor from
obtaining a patent substantially increases the risk encountered by
the investor, thereby reducing the expected value of the invest-
ment. Therefore, the critical date under U.K. law is contrary to
the profit incentive theory.
On the other hand, fixing the critical date to the filing date is
consistent with the contract theory of intellectual property because
84. See HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 47, at 318.
85. Patents Act, 1977 §§ 5, 130(1) (Eng.).
86. Id.
87. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Although the presumed critical date in the United
States is also the filing date, the patentee is allowed to antedate the prior art reference by
filing an affidavit alleging conception prior to the critical date of the prior disclosure. 37
C.F.R. 1.131 (1992). See also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
88. It should be noted, however, that even under the natural right theory, the
inventor's right is not absolute. She may abandon her right by actual abandonment (such
as an express dedication to the public) or constructive abandonment (as would arise from
excessive delays in filing a claim for her patent right).
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any public disclosure prior to that date renders the "contract"
between the inventor and the public invalid for want of consider-
ation. Similarly, designating the priority date as the date of filing
is consistent with the reward theory because the inventor should
not be entitled to a reward for "disclosing" what is already publicly
known.
In summary, the novelty requirement under U.K. law is in
accord with the contract and reward theories of intellectual
property. It is inconsistent, however, with the natural rights and
profit incentive theories.
3. Statutory Bar
a. Statutory Bar Under US. Law
In the United States, an inventor may be denied a patent if
the invention was in public use or offered for sale in the United
States, or patented or described in a printed publication anywhere
more than one year before the date of application.89 By provid-
ing a one-year grace period, the statute allows the inventor to
disclose the invention to the public without abandoning the patent.
Also, the grace period serves to protect the inventor from a
withdrawal of patent privileges in the event of a public disclosure
by another, because the inventor has twelve months to apply for
her patent. Nevertheless, the inventor must file promptly because
the statutory bar can also operate to deny all persons from
obtaining patent privileges in cases where third parties use or sell
the invention.' Like the novelty requirement, any sale or use
must be "public" in order to bar a patent under Section 102(b).91
Unlike novelty, however, the critical date is the filing date,' and
Rule 131 cannot be used to antedate a prior art statutory bar
reference. 93
The statutory bar provisions in U.S. patent law appear to be
incongruent with the natural rights theory of intellectual property
because under the statute, property rights are not inherent upon
conception, but instead conditioned on prompt filing. This is less
89. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
90. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61-62 (Ct. CI. 1981).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389, 1393 n.8 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
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true, however, where the public use, sale, or disclosure is commit-
ted by the inventor herself. In that situation, the principles of the
natural rights theory are not seriously violated, as the inventor
could be said to have purposely dedicated or abandoned the
invention to the public domain. Moreover, to allow otherwise
would effectively grant the inventor an extended patent monopoly
beyond seventeen years to the detriment of others who have
independently derived, used, or sold the invention.'
The conflicts between Section 102(b) and the natural rights
theory become more pronounced when the provision is applied to
allow the activities of a third party to bar a patent. In such cases,
the activities of one who has no vested natural right to the
invention can deny the inventor her patent.95 Yet, when the
statutory bar provision is viewed in light of other elements of U.S.
patent law, it becomes clear that the primary purpose of Section
102(b) is to protect public reliance" on the disclosed information,
and not merely to encourage prompt filing or to prevent unwar-
ranted extension of the patent monopoly. Because the inventor is
prohibited from abandoning the invention under Section 102(c), an
inventor cannot exploit the invention for an indefinite period of
time.' Furthermore, Section 102(b) differs from Section 102(c)
in that it predicates the bar of patent privileges on disclosure by
the inventor or another, indicating that the true policy justification
for Section 102(b) is to protect public reliance on the invention.9'
Further evidence of this underlying policy is the twelve-month
94. The purpose of Section 102(b) must be more than merely to encourage prompt
filing or to prevent unwarranted extension of the patent monopoly. Even without the
statutory bar provisions, an inventor cannot exploit the invention for an indefinite period
of time. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1988).
95. See General Elec. Co., 654 F.2d at 55. The court held that "it is well established
that a placing of the invention "on sale" by an unrelated third party more than 1 year
prior to the filing of an application for patent by another has the effect under § 102(b) of
invalidating a patent directed to that invention." Id. at 61-62.
96. The public may rely on the inventor's actions to its detriment in many ways. For
example, if the inventor publicly discloses an invention, others may be innocently induced
to invest substantial capital to produce similar and potentially infringing items.
97. This kind of abandonment is forbidden. 35 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1988). See also
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5,15 (1939) (holding that lengthy secret
use constitutes an abandonment of patent rights).
98. Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (stating that the "on
sale" bar to patentability and the one-year grace period are attempts "by Congress to
balance the interests of the inventor with the interests of the public").
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grace period" and the judicial interpretation of what constitutes
a "sale."'" By limiting the permissible period of time between
the public disclosure and the inventor's application, the statutory
bar provision limits the extent of public reliance on the disclo-
sure.1 1 Therefore, to the extent that Section 102(b) may be
argued as a protection of public reliance, it is fully consistent with
the natural rights theory of intellectual property.
In cases involving third parties, one may argue that the
statutory bar often prevents the first and true inventor from
obtaining a patent. For example, this is true when the statutory
bar arises from situations where a patent had been issued for the
invention in a foreign country before it was filed in the United
States. Under most circumstances, however, the statutory bar is
only a problem to an inventor who is not diligent in filing. For
example, the statutory bar is not a hurdle if an inventor files for
a patent within one year of the conception date. If she decides to
wait longer than one year, but does not publicly use or sell the
invention, her patent may be barred by third-party application of
Section 102(b).'
Another example of the influence of the natural rights theory
of intellectual property on U.S. patent law is the judicially-created
experimental use doctrine. Under the experimental use doctrine,
an inventor is not barred from obtaining a patent, even if the
invention has been publicly disclosed or sold, so long as the
disclosure was necessary to test the invention. This doctrine was
promulgated in City of Elizabeth v. Pavement Co.'0' In Eliza-
beth, the inventor of a new and improved wooden pavement
allowed public use of his invention for six full years before he
99. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
100. Where the inventor sells items that were made using a patented process, and the
product itself is not patented, courts have been less willing to find a statutory bar. See
W.L. Gore & Assoc. Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983). This idea is
consistent with the public reliance rationale, as the sale of a product made by a
non-disclosed process reveals nothing to the public.
101. The extent of injury from public reliance on the disclosure begins on the date of
the disclosure. If an inventor files shortly after public disclosure, the extent of public
reliance will be de minimus. If the inventor waits a lengthy period of time, the injury from
public reliance will increase.
102. Experimental use and sale for experimental use are judicially-created exceptions
to the statutory bar from public use or sale. See FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., 650 F.
Supp. 688 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
103. 97 U.S. 126 (1877).
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applied for a patent.' The statutory bar was offered as a
defense to an infringement action against the City of Eliza-
beth. 5 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that bona fide public use
of the invention for experimental purposes was exempt from the
statutory bar provisions."° The defense of patent invalidity by
statutory bar failed because the efficacy of the pavement invention
could not be shown without public experimentation."
The judicially-created experimental use exception is fully
consonant with the natural rights theory of intellectual property.
Although Section 102(b) provides incentives for the inventor to file
promptly, an additional policy behind Section 102(b) is to protect
public reliance on the invention."° Where experimental use is
not a factor, public reliance is protected from an elective disclosure
by an inventor who, thereafter, neglects to file for a patent within
one year. °9 In situations where the experimental use doctrine
applies, however, a different balance of equities is presented.
Here, to develop the invention fully, the inventor is compelled to
disclose it through experimental use. Where interests of public
reliance are balanced against a compelled disclosure, the balance
of equities is between two innocent parties." ° U.S. patent law
again demonstrates a policy consonant with the natural rights
theory by favoring the inventor over public reliance in experimen-
tal use cases.
Although the statutory bar may operate to increase the
inventor's risk level, it is not inconsistent with the profit incentive
theory of intellectual property. A large source of risk that the
statutory bar imposes on the inventor arises from obscure
third-party public disclosures. This risk, however, is mitigated by
the twelve-month grace period.' The inventor can decrease the
risk by periodically assuring herself that the invention has not been
disclosed. If a public disclosure is discovered, the inventor still has
104. Id. at 129. The inventor had constructed a pavement in a heavy traffic area near
a toll house. Id. at 133. Evidence was presented that the inventor was there almost daily,
examining its condition and striking it with his cane. Id.
105. Id. at 129.
106. City of Elizabeth, 97 U.S. at 135.
107. Id. at 136.
108. Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 580 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
110. Also, but for the experimental use doctrine, an inventor may instead file a patent
application for an unproven invention.
111. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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twelve months to file the patent application. In addition to
mitigating the risk of a third-party disclosure, the statutory bar also
substantially decreases another source of risk. Patents can be
expensive to obtain, and the market value of the patent is difficult
to determine without some market data. The twelve-month grace
period allows the inventor to ascertain the value of the patent by
publicly disclosing the invention or offering it for sale without
losing her patent right.
U.S. statutory bar provisions are not consistent with the
contract theory of intellectual property. Although U.S. law bars
a patent for a publicly disclosed invention, the inventor is allowed
a one-year grace period. This grace period may provide the
inventor compensation for information already publicly known.
This is inconsistent with the contract theory, as the inventor has no
secret to offer in exchange for the patent. Similarly, the U.S.
statutory bar provisions are inconsistent with the reward theory
because they may reward the inventor for information already
publicly known.
As the forgoing discussion demonstrates, U.S. statutory bar
provisions are consistent with the natural rights and profit
incentive theories, but inconsistent with the contract and reward
theories. The limitations imposed on the inventor by Section
102(b) are clearly to protect public reliance on an invention from
an inventor who voluntarily discloses the invention, and fails to file
for the patent within the prescribed time period.
b. Statutory Bar Under U.K. Law
The patent system of the the United Kingdom differs from
that of the United States in that it combines the features of the
U.S. novelty and statutory bar requirements in a single provi-
sion." 2  The critical date for U.K. patent law is the filing
date."3 Unlike U.S. patent law, U.K. patent law does not
provide the inventor with a grace period, unless the disclosure
occurred as a result of an unlawful breach of confidence, or
because the inventor displayed the invention at an international
exhibition.
114
112. Patents Act, 1977 § 2(2) (Eng.).
113. MERGES, supra note 29, at 165. See also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
114. Patents Act, 1977 § 2(2), (4) (Eng.). Even in cases of unlawful breach of
confidence or display at an international exhibition, the grace period is only six months.
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The natural rights theory of intellectual property would
demand that the first person to conceive of the invention retain
her patent right regardless of a subsequent public disclosure, as
long as the right was not abandoned. Because U.K. patent law
deprives the inventor of a patent if there is any public disclosure
of the invention, it conflicts with the natural rights theory of
intellectual property. Furthermore, because there is no grace
period except in cases of unlawful disclosure by another or other
special circumstances, public reliance cannot be advanced as a
policy rationale consistent with the natural right of the inven-
tor.115
U.K. patent law also departs from the profit incentive theory
of intellectual property to a greater extent than U.S. law. Under
U.K. patent law, a junior inventor may prevent a senior inventor
from obtaining a patent by publicly disclosing the invention before
the senior inventor files the patent application. 116 Under U.S.
law, the senior inventor can retain the right to a patent if she files
an application within twelve months of the public disclosure.
Consequently, in the United States, an inventor can minimize the
risk of her investment by closely monitoring developments in the
art and filing an application within one year of any public
disclosure."7  By allowing disclosure by another person"18 to
bar a patent immediately, the expected value of the return on the
investment in the United Kingdom is less than under U.S. law,
violating the premise of the profit incentive theory of intellectual
property.
While U.K. patent law departs from the natural rights and
profit incentive theories, it does agree with the contract and
reward theories of intellectual property. Under either the contract
or the reward theory, an invention already publicly disclosed by
another does not warrant the grant of a patent monopoly. Under
the contract theory, the inventor must provide the public with
Id&
115. The inventor loses her right to obtain a patent immediately upon public disclosure.
Id. § 2(2).
116. Id.
117. Even if the inventor is not closely monitoring developments in the art, under U.S.
law, the twelve-month grace period would still operate to reduce the risk of a statutory
bar. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
118. Public disclosures outside of the United Kingdom are within the scope of the prior
art. Patents Act, 1977 § 2(2) (Eng.).
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valuable consideration in exchange for the grant of a patent
monopoly. If the invention was already disclosed by another, the
contract fails for lack of consideration. Similarly, under the reward
theory, the degree of reward given to the inventor is proportional
to the usefulness of the invention to society. If the invention has
already been publicly disclosed, no reward is warranted. There-
fore, unlike U.S. law, which attempts to balance the rights of the
inventor and the public good, U.K. patent law is primarily based
on maximizing public good under the contract and reward theories.
4. Disclosure by Pending Patent Application
a. Disclosure by Pending Patent Application Under US. Law
An applicant for a patent in the United States may be denied
her patent privilege if an earlier pending U.S. patent application
discloses but does not claim the same invention.119 The scope of
the disclosure includes that which is obvious to those skilled in the
art. 20 The reference date of the pending patent is the U.S. filing
date.12 1 The inventor may, however, antedate the earlier refer-
ence and avoid denial of her patent by filing an affidavit alleging
specific facts that demonstrate either reduction to practice or
conception before the filing date of the earlier patent." This
provision in U.S. patent law is somewhat analogous to priority
disputes because in both cases, the patent applicant must deal with
truly secret art. 23
Section 102(e) codifies the Milburn rule. 24 In Milburn, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a pending patent application bars a
subsequent patent if the first application discloses, but does not
119. The earlier pending patent must eventually be issued for the patent to be denied.
When an earlier pending U.S. patent application discloses but does not claim the same
invention, the PTO declares a provisional rejection of the later-filed application. If the
earlier patent is not issued, the provisional rejection is rescinded. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
(1988).
120. Hazeltine Research v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255 (1965).
121. Id. at 254-55.
122. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1992).
123. Prior developments that were kept in absolute secrecy before a patent application
but come to light and are given retroactive effect from the period of secrecy are within the
category known as "secret" prior art. See Howard C. Wegner, Patent Harmonization, 554
A.L.I. BIoT*EcH. 171 (1990).
124. Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926).
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claim, the same invention."z Commentators have noted that the
Milburn decision rests on two basic propositions." The first is
the natural rights thesis that "one really must be the first inventor
in order to be entitled to a patent."' 27 Justice Holmes reasoned
that the second applicant was not truly the first inventor if the
invention was disclosed in an earlier application and the alleged
inventor was unable to "carry his invention back."'" The second
policy rationale for the Milburn decision is the policy against
removing the invention from the public domain. 29 While the
invention is not actually disclosed to the public until the patent is
issued, "[d]elays of the patent office ought not to cut down the
effect of what has been done."'"3 Justice Holmes reasoned that
if the patent were instantly filed, issued, and published, the
invention would have been made public property just as if it were
published in a periodical.
131
Although elements of natural rights, contract, and reward
theories are present in Milburn, the decision clearly focuses on the
rights of the initial inventor. Justice Holmes focused on the first
inventor's right to reissue the patent to claim what was disclosed
in her patent application. He was clearly concerned with the
natural right of the initial inventor when he stated: "A new
application and a claim may be based on an original description
within two years, and the original priority established notwith-
standing intervening claims.' ' 3 2  Further evidence of the natural
rights basis for Section 102(e) and the Milburn decision is the fact
that the effective date of the prior art reference is the filing date,
and not the date of issue. 133 Public reliance is simply not a factor
when a patent application is filed but the patent has yet to issue
125. If the pending patent application claimed the same invention, an interference
action would be declared. 37 C.F.R. § 1.605(a) (1992) (examiner suggests interference to
applicant); see also id. § 1.608 (1992) (prima facie showing by applicant in case of interfer-
ence between application and issued patent).
126. MERGES, supra note 29, at 283.
127. Alexander Milburn Co., 270 U.S. at 400.
128. Id. The later applicant may antedate the § 102(e) reference to the second
applicant's date of conception. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1992).
129. Alexander Milburn Co., 270 U.S. at 401.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 400-01.
132. Id. at 402. A patentee may obtain a reissue of a patent to expand the scope of her
claims, so long as no new matter is introduced. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1984).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (1988).
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because the public cannot be said to rely on the disclosure until it
is publicly known.
On one hand, Section 102(e) can be viewed as being consis-
tent with the profit incentive theory of intellectual property
because it increases the expected value of gain from an investment
in the inventive activity. Although Section 102(e) allows "secret
art" to bar a patent, Rule 131 allows the applicant to swear behind
the filing date of the patent application to antedate the reference.
Therefore, the first inventor to conceive can be assured that she
will not be barred from obtaining a patent."3  It may also be
argued that Section 102(e) is inconsistent with the profit incentive
theory, because it poses the additional risk of "secret art" on the
inventor. Because patent applications are not disclosed until they
are issued, an investor cannot know if someone else has filed a
patent application disclosing, but not claiming, the same invention.
Although the negative impact of this "secret art" on the invest-
ment's expected value is somewhat mitigated by Rule 131, the
inventor must still file the affidavit within one year of the filing
date of the disclosing application. 35 Because patent applications
typically remain pending for periods well in excess of one year, the
potential impact of Section 102(e) "secret art" is not completely
mitigated. Conversely, Section 102(e) reduces the risk that the
inventor will unwittingly dedicate information to public use by
failing to claim all that she discloses. Because this risk is within
the control of the inventor, Section 102(e) is consistent with the
profit incentive theory.
Under the contract theory, the inventor receives a patent in
exchange for an enabling disclosure of the invention. The Milburn
rule applies in special cases where the scope of the disclosure is
greater than the scope of the claim, and prevents another from
claiming the invention disclosed by the first inventor. The Milburn
rule is consistent with the contract theory because it prevents the
public from granting another inventor a patent monopoly for
something that will be in the public domain when the earlier
134. Rule 131 requires the applicant to file the affidavit within one year of the filing
date of the pending application that discloses the invention. Rule 131 allows the inventor
to antedate the filing date of the earlier disclosing patent application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.131
(1992). See also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
135. 35 C.F.R. § 1.131(a) (1992). See also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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patent is issued and published. 3 6  Yet, because the underlying
policy for the Milburn rule is to protect the senior inventor from
losing her patent monopoly privilege to another by mistakenly
claiming less than she disclosed, the Milburn rule should be
examined in light of the reissue provisions of U.S. patent law. The
reissue provisions allow an inventor to update a patent for the
remaining term to increase the scope of the claims if the reissue is
filed within two years of the first patent.137  Because the public
would receive the benefit of the disclosure anyway, the contract
theory would not compel the government to allow the inventor to
append new claims to the original application. Therefore, Section
102(e) is arguably inconsistent with the contract theory, as it
compels the public to compensate the inventor for information
already in public possession.38 Finally, Section 102(e) is consis-
tent with the reward theory because it prevents the reward from
being claimed by one who was not the true inventor.
As discussed above, Section 102(e) of the U.S. patent law is
consistent with all of the intellectual property justifications except
the contract theory. This conclusion is in stark contrast to U.K.
patent law.
b. Disclosure by Pending Patent Application Under U.K. Law
In the United Kingdom, an applicant for a patent may be
denied her patent privilege if an earlier patent application discloses
but does not claim the same invention."3  Unlike the United
States, the exact same invention must be disclosed,"4 and the
136. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). If a patent is issued that discloses but does not claim the
invention, the invention will nonetheless be publicly disclosed in the specification. Id.
137. Id. § 251 (1988). The inventor must allege that an error was made in the original
application without deceptive intent. It is a permissible error to claim less than what is
allowed by the scope of the disclosure. Id.
138. It may be argued that the U.S. law is not inconsistent with the contract theory
because the "contract" is based on a mutual mistake of the contracting parties as to a basic
assumption on which the "contract" was made that has a material effect upon the outcome
of the agreed exchange of performances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACMS §
152(1) (1986). Where the adversely affected party can be said to bear the risk of mistake,
the contract is not voidable by the affected party. Id. § 154. Contracts predicated on a
mistake by a single party may also be void if enforcement would be unconscionable, or if
the other party knew or had reason to know of the mistake. Id. § 153.
139. Patents Act, 1977 § 2(3) (Eng.) (allowing disclosures of earlier patent to negate
newness).
140. Id. § 3 (removing obvious variations of earlier patent disclosures from consider-
ation as prior art).
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earlier pending application need not issue to bar a later claim. 41
As in U.S. patent law, the date of the earlier reference is the filing
date, but the inventor is not given an opportunity to antedate the
reference.
142
These provisions of U.K. patent law are inconsistent with the
natural rights theory of intellectual property. Under U.K. patent
law, a senior inventor may be barred from obtaining a patent by
a junior inventor who files for the patent first. This is contrary to
the natural rights theory, which presumes that the inventor's right
matures when the invention is conceived. This is also in sharp
contrast to U.S. law, where the senior inventor can avoid a Section
102(e) bar by the application of Rule 131.143 Furthermore, by
allowing another person to obtain a patent on an obvious variation
of the disclosed invention, U.K. patent law effectively prevents the
earlier inventor from obtaining a patent monopoly commensurate
with the scope of her disclosure.
These provisions of U.K. patent law also appear inconsistent
with the contract theory because they allow a public disclosure of
the invention even if a patent is not eventually granted.' 44  For
this provision to accord with the contract theory, the valuable
consideration offered to the inventor in exchange for the disclosure
of the invention must be the opportunity to be considered for a
patent, not the patent itself.145  Also, by allowing obvious varia-
tions on the disclosed invention to be patented by another, the
consideration offered by the public in exchange for the inventor's
disclosure is substantially reduced."4 Similarly, the U.K. provi-
sions are inconsistent with the reward theory of intellectual
141. In the United Kingdom, all patent applications are published eighteen months after
they are filed, regardless of whether they are granted. MERGES, supra note 29, at 286.
142. Patents Act, 1977 § 2(3) (Eng.).
143. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
144. Patents Act, 1977 § 16 (Eng.). See also HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra
note 47, at 158 (stating that applications not withdrawn or refused after preparations for
publication have begun will be published as filed; because the Comptroller determines
when publication preparations are complete, it is best not to publish applications only
intended to give priority); MERGES, supra note 29, at 286.
145. Because the inventor knows of the rules in advance and the public lacks complete
discretion in the grant of a patent, this contract will not fail for lack of consideration. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (1986).
146. A patent monopoly that does not extend to include obvious variations of the same
invention is inherently less valuable. If a potential infringer desires to make, use, or sell
the invention, he or she need only obtain a patent for the same invention with a
non-inventive variation.
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property because they depreciate the reward given to the inventor.
By allowing obvious variations on the earlier disclosure to be
patented by another, U.K. patent law may remove from the public
domain an easily discoverable variation of the invention.
Finally, the U.K. provisions are inconsistent with the profit
incentive theory of intellectual property. In both the United States
and the United Kingdom, an inventor must choose between trade
secret protection and a patent monopoly.147 In the United
States, however, only issued patents are published." Therefore,
if an inventor chooses to pursue a patent and is unsuccessful, she
may still protect the information as a trade secret. On the other
hand, in the United Kingdom, the inventor faces the risk of
invention disclosure without an issued patent.149 By subjecting
the patentee to the risk of losing not only a patent but a trade
secret as well, U.K. patent law provisions are diametrically
opposed to the profit incentive theory of intellectual property.
5. Derivation
a. Derivation Under US. Law
Under U.S. law, a person who did not herself invent the
subject matter sought to be patented is said to have derived the
invention from another, and is not entitled to a patent.150  To
support a finding of derivation, "a challenger to a patent must
demonstrate both that the invention was previously conceived by
another person and that the complete conception was communicat-
ed to the patentee."'' The conception communicated must be
enough to enable one skilled in the art to construct and successful-
ly operate the invention.'52 Furthermore, acts performed abroad
may be admissible to resolve derivation issues.
15 3
Section 102(f) of the U.S. patent law protects the true
inventor's rights, and is thus consistent with the natural rights
theory of intellectual property. Yet, Section 102(f) does not offer
the true inventor complete protection. Although the patent
147. MERGES, supra note 29, at 286.
148. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1993) (applications for patents are normally kept confidential).
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988).
151. Pentech Int'l Inc. v. Hayduchok, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337, 1343 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
152. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 74 U.S. 583, 602-03 (1868).
153. Hedgewick v. Akers, 497 F.2d 905, 908 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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monopoly is removed from the person who derived the invention,
the true inventor may still be denied a patent if the invention was
disclosed more than one year before the true inventor files for the
patent.154
Section 102(f) is consistent with the profit incentive theory of
intellectual property. Because Section 102(f) decreases the risk
that another will "steal" the invention and attempt to patent it for
herself, it increases the expected value of the return on investment
in technological invention. Similarly, Section 102(f) is consistent
with the reward theory of intellectual property. Inventive activity
is not encouraged if society allows another person to steal the
invention and obtain a patent. If derivation were permitted,
society would be encouraging others to "steal" inventions,
effectively discouraging invention.
Conversely, Section 102(f) is somewhat inconsistent with the
contract theory of intellectual property. Under the contract
theory, whether the secrets were obtained honestly or surrepti-
tiously from another person should be immaterial.
1 55
In conclusion, Section 102(f) of the U.S. patent law is
consistent with all of the theories of intellectual property except
the contract theory. It is consistent with the natural rights theory
because it protects the first and true inventor; it is consistent with
the reward theory because it discourages derivation; and it is
consistent with the profit incentive theory because it increases the
expected value of the investment in invention.
b. Derivation Under U.K. Law
Under U.K. law, a patent is invalid if it was granted to the
wrong applicant.156 This provision of U.K. law is intended to
resolve cases of misappropriation of inventions or elements of
inventions.157 Because the effect of a successful challenge is to
destroy the patent, this provision is generally not used to resolve
154. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). In a contracts context, derivation is analogous to a
situation where one unknowingly contracts to buy stolen property. Section 102(f) merely
allows the public to retake the consideration that was granted in exchange for the
property; it does not return the property to its rightful owner.
155. Unlike the natural rights theory, the contract theory does not vest title to the
invention in the true inventor. Also, unlike the reward theory, the contract theory does
not encourage inventive activity directly; it merely pays for the disclosure of ideas.
156. Patents Act, 1977 § 72(1)(b) (Eng.).
157. HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, supra note 47, at 321.
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disputes over ownership.15 Furthermore, the proceedings must
be commenced within two years of the grant of the challenged
patent, unless, at the time of the patent grant, the proprietor of the
challenged patent knew that she was not entitled to the patent.159
U.K. law also forbids derivation of an invention. Consequent-
ly, the same theoretical justifications apply to both U.S. and U.K.
laws. Nevertheless, U.K. law differs from that of the United States
in two ways. First, in the United States, a patent may be rendered
invalid at any time after it is granted."6 Second, unlike the Unit-
ed States, to challenge the validity of a patent by derivation, the
U.K. Patents Court or Comptroller must first find the challenger
to be entitled to the grant of the patent or part of the patent.
161
By limiting both standing and the time period when a patent can
be challenged as granted to the wrong person, the U.K. provision
disagrees with the natural rights theory of intellectual property.
Under the natural rights theory, the true inventor should be able
to challenge the validity of the patent at any time. The U.K.
provisions are also less consistent with the natural rights theory
than U.S. law because the U.K. law gives the true inventor less
time to claim the patent herself.
162
The U.K. provisions are consistent with the profit incentive
theory of intellectual property because they reduce the risk of
losing a patent to another who misappropriated the invention.
Because the patent can only be challenged within two years of
issue, however, the U.K. provisions are less forgiving than those of
the United States. Nevertheless, the wary inventor can minimize
this danger, because patent disclosures are published within
eighteen months of application or declared priority date.163 This
gives the investor six months to find and challenge the offending
patent. The U.K. provisions are also consistent with the reward
theory because they encourage inventive activity and discourage
pilferage of inventions. Finally, the U.K. provisions are inconsis-
158. Id. at 321-22 n.3.
159. Patents Act, 1977 § 74(4)(b) (Eng.).
160. 35 U.S.C. § 102(0 (1988).
161. Patents Act, 1977 § 37 (Eng.).
162. The U.K. provision gives the inventor six months to file the patent application
from the time of a disclosure due to an unlawful breach of confidence. Id. § 2(4). In the
United States, the inventor has one year to file the application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
See discussion supra part III.B.3.
163. See supra note 141.
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tent with the contract theory of intellectual property in that they
may deny compensation to the discloser of the invention.
C. Priority
1. Priority Under U.S. and U.K. Patent Laws
After a patent application is filed in the United States, the
patent examiner determines whether there are any other applica-
tions pending that claim the same invention. If two or more
inventors claim the same invention in their applications, an
"interference action" is declared, and the PTO initiates a proceed-
ing to determine which of the two inventors should be granted the
patent.16'
This determination depends on the "priority date" of each
application. In the United States, three dates are relevant for
interference purposes. These are: (1) when the application was
filed with the PTO; (2) the date the invention was reduced to
practice; and (3) the date the invention was conceived. 165  The
conception date is the date that the inventor conceived a "definite
and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention.
166
An inventor is deemed to have reduced the invention to practice
when she produces the desired results by means conceived by
her. 67 Filing the application constitutes a constructive reduction
to practice and a constructive conception.168 Consequently, if the
inventor cannot prove the date of conception or reduction to
practice, she must rely on her filing date for priority. 69
Under U.S. law, an inventor may be entitled to priority even
if she is the second to file with the PTO if (1) she is the first to
reduce the invention to practice, and (2) she did not abandon,
suppress, or conceal the invention during the time interval
immediately preceding the priority date of the other party until the
164. Macedo, supra note 10, at 199.
165. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
166. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, 494 F. Supp. 370,407 (D.C. Del. 1980), affd, 664
F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). See also Bourns, Inc. v. Dale
Elec. Inc., 308 F. Supp. 501 (D.C. Neb. 1969).
167. Boyce v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1971).
168. Standard Oil Co. v. Montedison, 664 F.2d 356, 362-63 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 915 (1982).
169. It is difficult to prove conception and reduction to practice. Often, the inventor
must rely on the filing date as the critical date.
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date the invention was publicly disclosed. 7 ' This provision
compels the inventor to exercise due diligence in disclosing the
invention. The inventor cannot rely upon a timely reduction to
practice to the detriment of the public interest in a prompt
disclosure. Finally, an inventor may be entitled to priority even if
she was the last to file and the last to reduce to practice. This is
possible if the inventor was the first to conceive the invention and
exercised due diligence in reducing the invention to practice from
the time prior to the conception of the other party until the
invention was reduced to practice.'71 The U.S. law therefore
presumes that the first inventor to file the patent application with
the PTO is entitled to priority, but allows earlier conception and
diligent reduction to practice to overcome this presumption.
In comparison, under U.K. law, when two inventors claim the
same invention in pending applications, the first to file the
application is granted priority.172 Interference proceedings are
therefore unnecessary, and, unlike in the United States, the date
the competing inventors conceived of the invention or reduced it
to practice is irrelevant.
2. Priority Justifications Under Intellectual Property Theories
Under the natural rights theory, a person has a right to her
own ideas, including the right to exclude others. Furthermore,
because the right naturally exists even in the absence of positive
law, the right vests when the idea is conceived. To the extent that
Section 102(g) of the U.S. patent law allows the patent monopoly
to be awarded to the first to conceive the invention, it is in
agreement with the natural law theory of intellectual property.
Contrary to purely abstract natural rights principles, however, this
right is not absolute. U.S. law merely gives preference to the first
to conceive when both inventors in an interference action have
otherwise met all of the patent requirements. This may result in
cases where a patent is denied to the first true inventor, and
instead awarded to a junior inventor. Also, the senior inventor
must exercise due diligence in reducing the invention to practice
170. Disclosure must be in the form of filing the patent application. In re Schlittler, 234
F.2d 882, 884 (C.C.P.A. 1956) (holding that "a printed publication does not constitute a
reduction to practice, but is evidence of conception only").
171. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
172. Patents Act, 1977 § 5 (Eng.).
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and file promptly, or the patent may be lost to a junior inventor.
Clearly, Section 102(g) of the U.S. patent law is not based solely
on natural rights principles, but also upon practical considerations
favoring prompt and complete disclosure of the invention. It is
only when two qualified inventors apply for the same claims that
the U.S. patent law resorts to natural rights principles to settle the
dispute.
Under the reward theory, the inventor's reward is proportion-
al to the usefulness of the invention to society. The usefulness of
an invention to society is dependent on several factors, including
how well-known the invention becomes, the extent and social value
of its application, and how many other useful inventions are made
possible by the invention. All other factors being equal, an
invention is most useful to society when the disclosure is timely,
complete, widely known, and in a format best understood by other
potential inventors and those skilled in the art.
Considering the timeliness of the public disclosure, the
first-to-file system provides the inventor with two competing
incentives. The first incentive is to keep the idea secret until the
patent application is filed, as the inventor has little to gain and
much to lose by disclosing the invention before the filing date.173
This incentive is contrary to the goal of intellectual property
protection under the reward theory because it prevents early
disclosure. The second incentive provided by the first-to-file
system is to reduce the idea to practice and file the application as
soon as possible. Because the conception of the idea bestows no
vested right of priority on the inventor, she can best protect her
idea by reducing it to practice and filing the patent application as
soon as practicable. This incentive is consistent with the reward
theory because it compels both an early reduction to practice and
subsequent disclosure. Thus, the first-to-file system compels the
inventor to reduce the idea to practice and file earlier, but
provides incentive to keep the idea secret until filing.
Under the first-to-invent priority system employed in the
United States, a senior inventor may publicly disclose the invention
173. Market forces that may nonetheless compel an early disclosure are not discussed
in this Comment. In the United States, public disclosure of the invention occurs only after
the patent is granted. Macedo, supra note 10, at 199. Furthermore, in the United States,
the inventor can publicly announce the invention and still obtain a patent. The inventor
is protected by the statutory bar grace period. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see discussion
supra part III.B.3.
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and still obtain a patent if she files within a year of the disclo-
sure.174  Thus, the first-to-invent system furthers the goal of
rewarding the inventor in proportion to the worth of the invention
to society, because it allows earlier disclosure of the idea.
However, the inventor is not compelled to disclose her invention
until she files for the patent, and there are strong incentives that
may prevent the inventor from disclosing her invention until
absolutely necessary. 17  Hence, it is unclear which system best
rewards timely disclosure. The first-to-invent system allows
voluntary disclosure at an earlier time, but it does not provide
incentive for early filing. The first-to-file system discourages
disclosure at conception, but it strongly motivates the inventor to
reduce to practice and disclose the invention as soon as possible
thereafter.
The contract theory, so demonstrably prevalent in U.K. patent
law, is in complete consonance with the first-to-file system. In the
hypothetical bargain suggested by the contract theory, the issue of
whether the inventor pursuing the patent was the first to conceive
of the invention is completely irrelevant.17 6  Similarly, the con-
tract theory is substantially opposed to the first-to-invent system.
Because inventions sought by the public are most valuable if
promptly disclosed, the contract theory would compel awarding the
patent monopoly to the first to arrive at the hypothetical bargain-
ing table.
The first-to-file system is less consistent with the profit
incentive theory of intellectual property than is the first-to-invent
system, because it subjects the investor and inventor to greater
levels of risk. Under the first-to-invent system, the inventor is
subject only to the risk that someone else conceived the invention
first and was diligent in filing for the patent. Under this system,
the inventor need only be the first to conceive, and she will not
risk losing a filing race with an opponent. Consequently, one can
reduce the risk of investing capital in an invention already
conceived by another by making guarded inquiries into similar or
related efforts by other inventors.
174. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), (g) (1988).
175. The inventor may be unsure of the scope of protection allowed under law and, in
any case, would probably be better served by not disclosing until required to do so.
176. Macedo, supra note 10, at 224 n.167 (arguing that, because the underlying premise
is that people will be encouraged to produce and disclose new inventions if there is some
incentive, the contract theory would advocate the use of a first-to-file system).
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In the first-to-file system, the inventor is subject to the risk
that someone else will file for the invention first. This risk
includes two secondary elements: (1) the risk that someone else
conceived of the invention first; and (2) the risk that someone else
will make more rapid progress in reducing the invention to
practice and filing for the patent. Because the inventor has no
vested priority right by virtue of being the first to conceive of the
invention, she cannot easily reduce the risk of another's earlier
conception. She must investigate other inventors' efforts quite
cautiously, as they may have superior resources to win the race to
file for the patent. Under the first-to-file system, the most
effective way to ensure the patent award is to devote all available
resources to the effort to reduce the invention to practice as soon
as possible and file for the patent. This is in sharp contrast with
the first-to-invent system, which requires the inventor merely to
proceed diligently, but not heroically. Because the first-to-invent
system allows the inventor to proceed at a reasonable, planned
pace in reducing the invention to practice and filing for the patent,
it reduces both the cost of research and development and the
possibility that it will be futile.
IV. CONCLUSION: SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ADOPT THE
FIRST-TO-FILE SYSTEM?
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, U.S. patent law is firmly
rooted in natural rights and monopoly-profit-incentive theories of
intellectual property. For example, in the United States, novelty,
a basic requirement in patent law worldwide, is determined on the
date of invention rather than on the date of filing. Furthermore,
U.S. law allows the inventor to antedate prior art references to her
date of conception by filing an affidavit. In contrast, U.K. patent
law requires novelty to be measured at the filing date, a much
higher hurdle for the inventor and more consonant with a policy
favoring public good over the right of the inventor. Even the
statutory bar provisions of U.S. patent law, although offered to
prevent detrimental public reliance on an invention and unneces-
sary patent term extension, allow an inventor to obtain a patent if
the public disclosure can be justified as experimental use. In
contrast, U.K. patent law provides no such exemption.
Under U.K. patent law, disclosures in previous patent
applications may operate to bar a patent from another indepen-
dent inventor, even if the earlier patent is not eventually issued.
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In the United States, such disclosures only bar another applicant
if the competing patent is eventually issued, thus reserving the
inventor's patent right against the public so long as another
inventor is not similarly entitled. Furthermore, U.S. patent law
concerning disclosures in previous unissued applications is clearly
motivated by concern for the first inventor's right to claim the
invention she inadvertantly disclosed, rather than dedicating it to
the public. Also, unlike U.S. patent law, U.K. patent law prevents
derivation from another only in very narrow circumstances, and
actions can only be maintained within two years of the first filing.
Finally, other aspects of U.S. patent law not discussed in this
Comment, such as the lack of any compulsory licensing require-
ment, underscore U.S. concern and policy preference for the
natural right of the inventor.
Viewed in the aggregate, U.S. patent law is unlike any other
in that it is thoroughly steeped in concerns for the inventor's
natural right rather than the benefit of the public. Priority
disputes arise in a unique factual context in which both inventors
have a legitimate claim to the patent. Both inventors claiming
priority independently created the same invention and met all of
the patent requirements. The patent granting agency, therefore,
must choose between two deserving inventors. U.S. patent law
decides the issue in favor of the first to invent, but it does so by
the narrowest of margins. Absent a showing of prior conception
and diligent reduction to practice by the junior inventor, the
United States rewards the patent to the first person to file the
application. By presuming that the first person to file the
application is the true inventor, the law offers a reward and an
incentive for the inventor to file the application as soon as
possible. Section 102(g) of the U.S. patent law merely provides
the first inventor the opportunity to overcome this presumption by
offering proof that she is the first inventor. In doing so, the U.S.
patent law protects the natural right of the inventor. The wisdom
of this choice is also clear when viewed in a utilitarian context:
When faced with two desirable activities, invention and disclosure,
U.S. patent law expresses a preference, albeit a narrow one, for
invention.
The priority provisions of Section 102(g) are only a small
tributary of a larger undercurrent in U.S. patent law that reflect
this clear policy preference. This legacy of respect for the integrity
of the inventor's natural right should not be set aside merely for
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the sake of harmonization. Whether the United States'
first-to-invent priority system is superior to the first-to-file system
imposed in other nations will remain the subject of debate for
some time to come. What appears certain is that if the United
States adopts the first-to-file system of priority, its patent laws will
necessarily undergo a fundamental change in character from one
that focuses on the individual to one that focuses on public benefit.
Such a fundamental change may tear the very fabric of U.S. patent
law, and perhaps U.S. innovation.
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